May 19, 2015.

What was the "special relationship" between the U.S. and China? Why did both countries enter into an alliance during WWII?

During the continuing Japanese aggression against China – starting as early as 1931 when the Japanese Army invaded Manchuria, and then set up its puppet state called Manchukuo, with the last Qing emperor Henry Puyi as its puppet head of state – to 1937 when again, the Japanese Army concocted the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, and began the invasion of China – the U.S. and China had enjoyed a kind of “special relationship” between the two countries, and eventually formed a strategic military alliance to counter the Japanese aggression against China during WWII.

The Japanese Occupation of Manchuria in 1931 - which they named "Manchukuo":

Manchukuo (1932–1934) 滿洲國 or 满洲国  Mǎnzhōuguó  (Chinese) 満州国  Manshū-koku  (Japanese) (Great) Empire of Manchukuo (1934–1945) (大)滿洲帝國 or (大)满洲帝国 (Dà) Mǎnzhōu Dìguó  (Chinese) (大)満州帝国  (Dai) Manshū Teikoku  (Japanese)
Puppet state of the Empire of Japan
←  1932–1945  →
Flag Imperial Seal
Anthem National Anthem of Manchukuo
Location of Manchukuo (red) within Imperial Japan's sphere of influence.
Capital		Hsinking (Changchun) (until August 9, 1945) Tonghua (Linjiang) (until August 18, 1945)
Languages		Japanese Mandarin Chinese Mongolian Manchu (unofficial)[1]
Government		Single-party state (1932-1945) Constitutional monarchy UnderAuthoritarian-Personalist Dictatorship
Chief Executive
-	1932–1934	Aisin-Gioro Puyi (or Henry Puyi, Puppet Emperor of Manchukuo, last of the Qing Dynasty emperors.
Emperor
-	1934–1945	Kangde (Aisin-Gioro Puyi)
Prime Minister
-	1932–1935	Zheng Xiaoxu
-	1935–1945	Zhang Jinghui
Legislature		Legislative Council
Historical era		Interbellum · World War II
-	Established	1932
-	Disestablished	1945
Currency		Manchukuo yuan
Today part of		China

Manchukuo
Chinese name
Traditional Chinese	滿洲國
Simplified Chinese	满洲国
Literal meaning	Manchu State
[show]Transcriptions
Japanese name
Kanji	満州国
Kana	まんしゅうこく
[show]Transcriptions

Empire of Manchuria
Chinese name
Traditional Chinese	大滿洲帝國
Simplified Chinese	大满洲帝国
[show]Transcriptions
Japanese name
Kanji	大満州帝国
Kana	だいまんしゅうていこく

The Japanese Invasion of China - starting with the "Marco Polo Bridge Incident" in 1937:

Marco Polo Bridge Incident
Part of the Second Sino-Japanese War
Japanese forces bombarding Wanping, 1937
Date 7–9 July 1937 Location Vicinity of Peking, China 39°50′57″N 116°12′47″ECoordinates: 39°50′57″N 116°12′47″E Result Japanese attack repulsed[1] Beginning of the full scale invasion of China in the Second Sino-Japanese War
Belligerents
Republic of China	Empire of Japan
Commanders and leaders
Song Zheyuan  Qin Dechun (Mayor of Beijing, Lieutenant-General)[2]	Kanichiro Tashiro
Strength
~100[1]	5,600[3]
Casualties and losses
All but 4 soldiers killed in action[1]	Unknown

[hide] v t e Second Sino-Japanese War Major engagements in bold Began in 1931–37 Mukden Manchuria  Jiangqiao Nenjiang Bridge Jinzhou Harbin Shanghai (1932) Pacification of Manchukuo Rehe Great Wall Inner Mongolia  Suiyuan Began in 1937–39 Marco Polo Bridge Beiping-Tianjin Chahar Shanghai (1937)  Sihang Warehouse Beiping-Hankou Railway Tianjin-Pukou Railway Taiyuan Pingxingguan Xinkou Nanjing Xuzhou Taierzhuang N.-E.Henan  Lanfeng Amoy Chongqing Wuhan Wanjialing Canton  Hainan Nanchang  Xiushui River Suixian-Zaoyang  Swatow 1st Changsha S.Guangxi Kunlun Pass Winter Offensive  West Suiyuan Wuyuan Began in 1940–42 Zaoyang-Yichang Hundred Regiments N. Vietnam C. Hubei S.Henan W. Hebei Shanggao S.Shanxi 2nd Changsha 3rd Changsha Yunnan-Burma Road Tachiao Oktwin Toungoo Yenangyaung Zhejiang-Jiangxi Sichuan invasion Began in 1943–45 W.Hubei N.Burma-W.Yunnan Changde Ichi-Go C.Henan 4th Changsha  Hengyang Guilin-Liuzhou W.Henan-N.Hubei Mt. Song W.Hunan 2nd Guangxi Others Aerial engagements

The U.S. policy makers pursued several different diplomatic policies in each phase of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), as China called this WWII China theater war, and these reflected the complex and changing developments in the international arena, and the domestic political environment in the United States. The U.S. policies towards China, we could say, fit onto four phases:

·         First, a “non-interference” policy from 1937 to 1939;

·         Second, a “strong word but no action” policy from 1939-1940;

·         Third, an “assistance to China and restraint to Japan” policy from 1940-41; and,

·         Fourth, an “alliance with China against Japan” policy, in the wake of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 – “A Day of Infamy” as President Roosevelt said, and then declared war against Japan, marking the entry of the U.S. into WWII.

The Policy of “Non-Interference” from 1937 to 1939:

This was the period of economic and social recovery from the disastrous effects of the global Great Depression of 1933, and the U.S. (and all other powers, including Western powers) domestic concentration to get out of this mess.

At the same time, this was also a period of appeasement by the U.S. and Western powers, in the face of a militarily-stronger Japan, and the U.S. and Western powers, together with the League of Nations could turn its back on China, despite Chiang Kai-shek’s exhortation for the international community to condemn and impose economic sanctions on Japan for its aggression. The League of Nations feebly condemned Japan and requested Japan to vacate Manchuria. Japan, of course, thumbed its nose at this world body’s inaction and weakness, and walked out of the League of Nations in 1933.

The “Strong Word, No Action” Policy from 1939 to 1940:

Japan’s naked aggression against China again happened on July 7, 1937, when it staged the “Marco Polo Bridge Incident” or “Lugouqiao (Lugou Bridge) Incident” or the “July 7th Incident” and used this Incident as a pretext to launch a full-scale invasion of China. China declared war against Japan, and this date is often marked as the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945).

Despite Chiang Kai-shek’s desperate call for help to the international community to condemn Japan’s aggression, and especially to the United States, none came, and China had to fight this war all by itself from 1937 to 1940.

The Policy of “Assistance to China and Restraint to Japan” from 1940-1941, and The Policy of “Alliance with China Against Japan” From December 7, 1941 to September 1945:

This period has been characterized by many as the period of “special relationship” between the U.S. and China, especially in their mutual hatred of the Japanese aggressor, and, in the United States' case, the Japanese uncalled-for attack on Pearl Harbor on December 07, 1941, "A Day of Infamy" as President Roosevelt called it, sealed the U.S. fate as it declared War on Japan same day, and the U.S. formal entry into WWII - and in their common efforts to defeat this enemy. 

Images for japanese attack pearl harbor on December 7, 1941:Report images

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But just how “special” was this “special relationship”? [my own emphasis], and why did both countries enter into this alliance during these WWII periods?

I think it is very important to examine these relationships in more detail, which I will do here, in the following paragraphs:

·         On the Asian continent, and on the Eastern Front, China carried the brunt of the fighting against Japanese aggression – with no help from any other country, until 1940, despite many exhortations from Chiang Kai-shek to the U.S. primarily, to step in and assist his poorly-trained, corrupt army with equipment, materiel, training and supply logistics.

·         The United States initially advised and supported China’s ground war, while basing only a few of its own units in China for operations against Japanese forces in the region, and Japan itself. The primary American goal here was to keep the Chinese actively in the Allied forces war camp, thereby tying down Japanese forces that otherwise might be deployed against the Allied fighting in the Pacific [my own emphasis].

·         But once the U.S. ramped up its logistical and military support to Chiang Kai-shek’s forces, admittedly, it faced two fundamentally different challenges in the Chinese theater:

·         The first challenge was political. Despite facing a common foe in Japan, Chinese society then was polarized: Some Chinese were supporters of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Kuomintang government; some supported one or more of the numerous former warlords nominally loyal to the Nationalists; and some supported the communists under Mao Zedong, and these were engaged in a guerilla war against the military and political forces of the Nationalists! Continuing tensions, which broke out into pitched battles among these factions, precluded the development of a truly united Chinese war effort against the Japanese.

·         The second challenge in the China theater was logistical. Fighting a two-front war of its own, simultaneously having to supply other Allies, and facing enormous distances involved in moving anything from the United States to China, the United States could not sustain the logistics effort required to build a modern Chinese army. Without sufficient arms, ammunition, and equipment, let alone doctrine and leadership training, the Chinese Nationalist Kuomintang Army of Chiang Kai-shek’s was incapable of driving out the Japanese invaders by themselves.

·         Moreover, a “Europe-First” U.S. policy automatically lowered the priority of China for U.S.-manufactured arms, behind the needs of U.S. forces, of other European allies, and of the Soviet Union.

·         By the summer of 1939, Japan controlled most of northeastern China and all major coastal seaports, except for the British Crown Colony port of Hong Kong. In short, China was isolated, except for supplies moving from the west along the so-called Burma Road or through French Indochina. But British reluctance to provoke Japan, limited shipments through Hong Kong, and French acquiescence to Japanese occupation of northern Indochina in September 1940 left Rangoon, Burma, the closest friendly port to Nationalist-held areas in China. Having crossed nearly 14,000 miles by sea, the U.S. Lend-Lease aid to China next went by rail to Lashio in northern Burma, and then 715 miles by truck over the Burma Road to Kunming, China. Over this precarious route, only a trickle of supplies arrived at Kunming. Burma’s loss to Japan’s armies in late 1942 cut this one remaining overland resupply route. The closest port for Chiang was now in India, and henceforth all supplies earmarked for China had to travel by air over the Himalayas, the Hump, making the delivery more precarious, dangerous, and time-consuming.

·         But perhaps the biggest obstacle to this “special relationship” was the personality and personal relationship between Army Lt. General Joseph W. Stilwell, who was appointed by President Roosevelt in March 1942, to be the head of the U.S. China-India-Burma theater, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Stilwell’s appointment was made as the U.S. government moved fast to establish a military theater of operations in China, after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, brought America into the war. Each never saw eye to eye with the other in many aspects of this war against the Japanese aggressors. Moreover, all major army positions in Chiang’s Nationalist Army were held by appointed U.S. military officers. The entire effort was yet another U.S. design for equipping and organizing selected Chinese Army units for specific campaigns under American direction, which thus clashed with Chiang’s and his officers’ views on how to fight the Japanese.

Joseph Stilwell
General Joseph Warren Stilwell, U.S. Army
Birth name	Joseph Warren Stilwell
Nickname(s)	"Vinegar Joe," "Uncle Joe," "Old Two Shirts."
Born	March 19, 1883 Palatka, Florida, United States
Died	October 12, 1946 (aged 63) San Francisco, California, United States
Allegiance	United States of America
Service/branch	United States Army
Years of service	1904–1946
Rank	General
Commands held	7th Infantry Division III Corps China Burma India Theater Chinese Expeditionary Force (Burma) Chinese Army in India Northern Combat Area Command(NCAC) Army Ground Forces U.S. Tenth Army U.S. Sixth Army Western Defense Command
Battles/wars	World War I Western Front Battle of St. Mihiel World War II Burma Campaign 1942–1943 Battle of Northern Burma and Western Yunnan Burma Campaign 1944
Awards	Distinguished Service Cross Distinguished Service Medal (2) Legion of Merit
Other work	Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

Conclusion:

U.S. operations in China involved only a handful of U.S. ground and logistical units – such as General Chennault’s “Flying Tigers” fame – in support of Chiang’s huge army of some 3,000,000 soldiers, but mostly very poorly trained and equipped.

Images for general chennault flying tigersReport images

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1. Claire Lee Chennault

   Aviator
2. Lieutenant General Claire Lee Chennault was an American military aviator best known for his leadership of the American "Flying Tigers" and the Republic of China Air Force in World War II.Wikipedia
4. Born: September 6, 1893, Commerce, Texas, United States
5. Died: July 27, 1958, New Orleans, Louisiana, United States
6. Spouse: Anna Chennault (m. 1947–1958),Nell Thompson (m. 1911–1946)
7. Organizations founded: Flying Tigers,Civil Air Transport
8. Children: Jack Chennault, Max Thompson Chennault, More
9. Parents: John Stonewall Jackson Chennault, Jessie Lee Chennault

The U.S. “special relationship” with China - especially with Chiang’s China - were complicated and confounded by the civil war between Chiang’s Kuomintang Army and Mao Zedong’s peasant “Red Army”. At one time, Chiang kept over 500,000 of China’s best soldiers to fight the Communists. Any hope of creating an effective and conventional Chinese military, while temporarily shelving China’s internal political problems, were unrealistic and unachievable.